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Abstract— The advertised EC policy toward sugar is 
clearly to let market drive supply and demand. But 
there exist reasons to think that the setting up of the 
traditional quota policy was not a consequence of 
chance, or of an efficient lobbying system by farmers, 
but of practical necessity and of efficiency, in face of 
market failures. In view of this reasoning, it is not 
impossible that a large crisis in the more or less remote 
future leads to reinstall a  sugar quota system which 
probably should had to be reformed, but should never 
have been  suppressed.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A European sugar market stands as a very new idea, after 
so many years of quotas, administered prices and other 
deviations from market law. Yet, it is indeed a very old 
idea, so old that, after such a long time of oblivion, it looks 
now as being new. In most European countries, sugar 
production has been more or less isolated from market since 
at least 1931 (the first international sugar agreement, 
already defining production quotas among stakeholders), 
and even earlier (remember the Napoleonic “continental 
blockade”, at the origin of the development of sugar beet in 
Europe). Especially since the Common market inception, 
the European sugar industry has been characterized by a 
government fixed domestic price, and a system of 
production quotas.  
 
In face of this situation, it is generally agreed upon that 
we should come back to the good old time when free market 
was matching supply and demand without causing 
headaches to EC executives.  Actually, common elementary 
economic theory shows that market in this respect is 
normally very efficient, equating marginal cost with price, 
thus maximizing the global surplus of consumer and 
producer together. In addition, at international level, by 
exploiting the benefits from comparative advantage, the 
market guarantees the minimal price compatible with 
demand, thus benefiting to consumer, while benefiting also 
the poor, the only workers capable of producing at that 
price. Who could resist such a set of advantages?  
 
Yet, before answering this question, we must perhaps ask 
ourselves why is it that, while the advantages were also 
present at the origin, our forerunners decided to leave them 
out, and judged preferable disconnecting sugar from market.  
Indeed, a market is a fairly “natural” institution, which 
normally emerges spontaneously, as soon as the benefits of 
specialisation and of comparative advantage become 
apparent. A sugar market existed in Europe before 1931. On 
the contrary, the decision of twisting markets in order to 
substitute another mode of regulation for production and 
consumption requires political decisions which, at least in 
principle, should not be taken lightly. What was the 
motivation, at that time, for isolating European sugar 
national productions from market? And have these reasons 
disappeared, thus justifying the new course of government 
action, coming back to the old idea of market?  
 
I - WHY HAVE OLD PRACTITIONNEERS CUT THE 
LINK BETWEEN AGRICULTURE AND MARKET?  
 
Actually, these motives were expressed in the debates 
regarding the 1931 sugar agreement, and can be 
summarized in five words: the market was not functioning 
properly (despite efforts in 1903, see:  [1]). Indeed, at that 
time as now, the free international market resulted in prices 
sometime much too high and sometimes much too low to 
reflect the actual long run cost of production. In such 
situations, producers benefit and consumers suffer (or the 
contrary), but in any case, losses are greater than benefits. A 
large body of literature was devoted to this issue in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. Let us only remember 
Waugh [2], Oi[3], Massell [4] and many others. They do not 
congregate on the ultimate beneficiary of instability: for 
instance, Oi consider instability is good for the consumer, 
while others assert that consumer pay the cost at the end. 
But all agree upon at least one thing: instability is bad for 
society. In this context, any institutional innovation capable 
of making price closer from cost brings a social benefit.  
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In face of such a situation, actions are requested to 
correct failures. But action cannot be efficient unless the 
reason for the failure is correctly assessed. The reasons for 
this situation in the case of sugar (contrasting with many 
other goods and services) are deep and long lasting. They 
were analysed by many now forgotten economists such as 
Galiani[5](in 1770 !) or Ezekiel[6] (at the end of the 30’s) : 
with production delays and a low price  demand elasticity, 
the market equilibrium point is instable (in the mechanical 
meaning of the word : in the vicinity of equilibrium, forces 
which drive the system lead it further away if it is 
fortuitously deviated from this point, just as a ball in 
equilibrium at the sharp end of a pencil).  
 
The old “cobweb theorem” actually shows that. Let the 
slopes of the demand and supply curves be α and a, 
respectively, while production decisions are based on naive 
expectations (producer assume the current price will last at 
least one season) . Then, if |α/a| > 1, any departure from 
equilibrium will result in a new price even more distant 
from the true equilibrium price than the initial one. On the 
contrary, with |α/a| <1, each successive price will be closer 
to equilibrium, in such a way that the market “converges” to 
optimum. For that reason, the situation of markets is quite 
different according to the supply and demand parameters. 
This is the reason for why Ezekiel considered possible to let 
free market operate in the case of “luxury” products, while 
State intervention was required for first need good – 
especially, agricultural goods
1.     
 
The weakness of the cobweb model is of course that it is 
not possible to imagine prices and quantities swinging 
between -∞ and +∞. When the system comes vary far from 
equilibrium, there must exist other forces tending to turn it 
back toward it. But price can never stay for long in the 
vicinity of the long run equilibrium point, resulting in 
chaotic motions (again, in the mathematical sense of the 
word) for the price and production time series. Boussard[7], 
among many others, showed that such mechanisms are 
possible.  
 
In such a context, government actions aiming at 
regulating market, especially with production quotas, can be 
largely beneficial in terms of welfare. This is especially the 
case for sugar.  
 
II - WHICH FUTURE FOR THE WORLD SUGAR ?  
 
                                                           
1 The argument was made use of in convincing the reluctant 
Supreme Court not to reject the Roosevelt Agricultural Adjustment 
Act. See  Lindsey [9] 
In effect, the consequences of a liberalisation of the sugar 
industry have been examined in this context by Boussard 
and Piketty[8]: they build a model of the sugar food chain 
which give the results presented on figure 1 and 2 : as we 
can see, prices are much more volatile “with” than 
“without” liberalisation.  
 
Figure 1 : World prices for raw and white sugar, present 




Figure 2 : World prices for raw and white sugar, 
liberalized 
 
Then, who benefit and who suffer from the change ? The 
surplus accruing to various agents in the chain are shown 
below (figures 3 to 6).   It is readily shown that farmers 
suffer from reduced production, while consumers suffer 
from higher mean price. This is a classical effect of 
introducing risk considerations in a model. Government – 
especially developing countries government – suffer from 
the reduction of import taxe – it is true, at the same time, 
that governments of rich countries avoid a few subsidies, 
although not so much in the case of sugar, because subsidies 
are paid by consumers. Finally, the major beneficiaries are 
the refiners, who benefit from speculating on stocks – 
although without significant effects on the price volatility.    3 
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How can such a disaster be explained? Essentially, by the 
bad functioning of markets, which calls for  State 
intervention in order to correct market failure. And how can 
State intervene in such a situation ? Precisely, by setting up 
a system of production quotas, just as the sugar practitioners  
































Figure 5 : Sugar refiners surplus  
 
In effect, a natural way of settling the problem just stated 
is to provide producers with a guaranteed price. If the price 
is in the vicinity of the long run equilibrium price, the 
system is in principle costless for the government, because 
what is lost when external price is low is regained in periods 
of high prices. This is true in a static reasoning. It is not 
anymore true in dynamics: in the long run, with a 
production function homogenous and of degree one, the 
production, in face of an invariant price, is either zero or 
infinite. In such a case, assuming the price is high enough 
for avoiding zero production, the government will be 
obliged to accept enormous disposal costs
2. Hence the 
necessity of providing a price guarantee for a limited 
































Figure 6 : Goverrnment taxes  
 
In this way, the quota system is quite similar to a futures 
market – except that the cost of the risk tacking is fully born 
by the State a no price, while, otherwise, speculators must 
be rewarded for having accepted carrying risks in the place 
of farmers. It is by no means contradictory with markets, 
since quantities exceeding quotas can very well be traded at 
the producer risks. Only, in that case, it is necessary that the 
total allocated quotas be less than domestic production: 
then, any quantity sold on the world market is produced at 
marginal cost plus a risk premium, in exactly the same way 
as in the absence of any production policy. In that respect, 
                                                           
2 As a matter of fact, this is exactly what happened in the EC for 
most supported commodities. This outcome had been predicted at 
the CAP inception by economists such as Colin Clark [10], who 
had seen the guaranteed price system as the main vulnerability of 
the ongoing institutional building.  
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quotas are even less distortive than is the present system of 
decoupled payments (the dynamic consequences of which 
are in general underestimated).  
1.  CONCLUSIONS  
The future of the European sugar chain is therefore 
gloomy in the short run. It will certainly be improved 
in the long run, when the necessity of reinstalling the 
quotas system, the efficiency of which is proven, will 
become apparent. Unfortunately, the occurrence of a 
deep crisis will be necessary for that to occur.  But 
how could economists be taken seriously without 
crisis?  
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